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It should be notes that any opinions expressed in this article are the responsibility of the author and not of the Institute. BACKGROUND: 1986 SANCTIONS Let me step back for a moment to 1986 in order to trace how it is I arrive at this conclusion. In 1986, the US Congress adopted, over President Reagan's veto, the Comprenensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA). The legislation imposed a variety of economic penalties on South Africa, and at the same time outlined in some detail the conditions that would have to arise to permit the US to lift sanctions. The measure remains among the toughest adopted by western countries in the effort by anti-apartheid proponents to make minority rule in South Africa unworkable.
Without at this point going into the details of the act, I think we can learn some lessons about the current debate by reviewing the politics and process by which the CAAA became law.
In 1986, South Africa was experiencing township uprisings. In Washington D.C., the debate over American policy toward South Africa quickly turned into what was in effect a 'congressional uprising'.
It is important to remember that, in general, Congress does not often or lightly take on a president in the field of foreign policy. From time to time it engages in a sort of hit-and-run attack on a specific foreign policy budget item, ambassadorial nomination, or arms agreement, but only very rarely does it mount a wholesale assault on a basic element of the administration's international relations agenda. .
In recent decades, this type of congressional rebellion has occurred in only a handful of cases: under Presidents Johnson and Nixon, it was the Vietnam war; under President Carter, the SALT II arms control treaty with tha Soviet Union; under President Reagan, US intervention in Nicaragua and policy toward South Africa. They occur, very simply, when the president's policy so significantly diverges from public opinion that large numbers of elected legislators judge that they pay unacceptable po1i ti cal costs for endors ing it, and i nstead reap rich political rewards by defying it.
• .
In 1986, Ronald Reagan was aware of growing public pressure to toughen his 'constructive engagement' approach to South Africa. He knew he was facing the possibility of a politically damaging congressional uprising, but for at least three reasons, Reagan was ' prepared to do battle with Congress rather than compromise.
First, there was a policy motive. Reagan sincerely disagreed with those who wished to employ sanctions against Pretoria. Although he had backed the use of economic pressure against Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, Syria, Poland, and the Soviet Union, and he would later endorse a near total economic boycott of Panama, Finally, and perhaps most importantly, advocates of a new poii cy made a compo11i ng case that the maj or i ty of South Africans were pleading for the United States to take tougher action. Proponents argued that sanctions" by increasing the economic costs of apartheid, conveying a strong message of international disapproval and continuing to isolate the country, could over time help to persuade rising numbers of Whites to support change.
By contrast, supporters of constructive engagement, who were burdened with defending the status quo, could muster few examples of the policy's success. P.W. Botha had provided few rewards for Reagan's troubles.
In the end, of course, Presidant Reagan suffered a rare and humiliating defeat. More than two-thirds of both the Democratic House of Representatives and the Republican-controlled Senate endorsed the CAAA. In a head-to-head confrontation, the White House lost effective control over US policy toward South Africa.
In looking at the policy prospects for the next year or two, let us bear in mind the balance of forces which brought about the 1986 result. In 1989, the strengths and weaknesses of the three major actors are quite different. Let us examine each of them: the President, the House of Representatives, and the Senate.
PRESIDENT BUSH AND SOUTH AFRICA
In contrast to Ronald Reagan, George Bush comes to the South Africa issue in a politically vulnerable state. Remember that Reagan entered his second term on the heels of a landslide victory over Democratic challenger Walter Mondale. Bush won the presidency in the t988 election by large popular and electoral vote majorities, but it is critical to bear in mind -because the political experts in the White House do so -that distortions caused by the electoral college voting system mask what was actually a vary close win by Bush over Democrat Michael Dukakis. Secondly, the Senate contains no body comparable to the House Africa Subcommittee, which has launched most of the anti-apartheid bills. On paper, 1t 1s true, the Senate has regional subcommittees attached to the venerable Foreign Relations Committee.
But, compared to the House, these are regional subcommittees in name only, at least the way the. Senate is currently organised. The Africa Subcommittee, for example, has no separate staff, no separate offices, and has held no separate hearings. Consequently, all Africa-oriented legislation must compete for time, attention, and staff resources against every other foreign policy issue for action in the full Foreign Relations Committee. This represents a structural bottleneck for proponents of aggressive lawmaking.
Thirdly, since January 1987, the chairman of the Africa Subcommittee -in theory, the Senate vicar of Africa legislation -has been Illinois Democrat Paul Simon. Yet for most of 1987 and half of 1988, Simon was preoccupied with his campaign for the presidency. In addition, he was relatively new to Africa policy and needed time to gather knowledge and experience before playing a leading role in anti-apartheid debates.
For these reasons, the Senate proved in 1938 more persuaded than the House by the Reagan Administration warning that new sanctions would threaten the Angola/Namibia accords. While the Dellums Bill -after considerable delay -squeaked out of the Foreign Relations Committee on a party-line 10 to 9 vote, majority leader Robert Byrd then declined to bring it to the floor of the Senate before the session came to an end.
In one important respect, however, anti-apartheid legislation advocates have a new key asset 1n 1989. As in the House, a rare leadership change has occurred in the Senate. Maine Democrat George Mitchell, who is one of those v&ry few unabashed liberals to still exist in the Senate, recently won an election as the chamber's new majority leader. In this post, he can have enormous influence over the Democrats' agenda, and over what measures get through to tha floor for votes. His Secondly, Bush is a multilateralist. Reagan had the US go it alone on Angola -he abandoned the Western Five contact Group, was the only leader to support Jonas Savimbi's Unita, and unilaterally sponsored the negotiations over Angola and Namibia.
Bush seems more interested in having the US cooperate with its allies, and in particular the UK, rather than in sustaining Reagan's 'lonesome cowboy' approach. I suspect he recognises that one of the great problems with international policy towards Pretoria is the cacophony of messages emerging from the world's capitals on apartheid. My guess is that he will try to work on ways to synchronise US policy with those of Britain, the European Community, Japan and Canada. As far as the sticks go, I think it likely that Bush will have to accept the use of economic pressure in some manner, or else face a. revolt in Congress, probably next year. He may suggest some targeted sanctions early on, or he may pledge to adopt certain sanctions later, in the event that Pretoria makes insufficient progress in meeting some specified conditions. But fcr Bush's policy to be credible in Congress, it must be tougher than Reagan's, and that means some form of admission that economi.c pressure plays a role in American policy toward South
Africa.
